

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 091105
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY NEA:PWLANDE
APPROVED BY NEA:ALATHERTON
S/S:JETHYDEN

-----065301 090112Z /64

O 090058Z APR 78 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE
INFO AMCONSUL BOMBAY IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

S E C R E T STATE 091105

NODIS

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: US, IN

SUBJECT: APRIL 7 CALL ON SECRETARY BY INDIAN AMBASSADOR
PALKHIVALA

1. INDIAN AMBASSADOR PALKHIVALA ACCOMPANIED BY DCM GOKHALE
AND FIRST SECRETARY RAJAN CALLED ON SECRETARY APRIL 7. NEA
ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON AND COUNTRY DIRECTOR LANDE
(NOTETAKER) ALSO SAT IN. LENGTHY MEETING COVERED NUCLEAR
COOPERATION, DESAI VISIT AND POSSIBLE PURCHASE OF DPSAS BY
GOI. HIGHLIGHTS FOLLOW.

2. MEETING OPENED WITH GENERAL REVIEW OF JUNE 13-14 DESAI
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 091105

VISIT. AMBASSADOR NOTED DESAI WOULD ADDRESS SSOD ON JUNE 9
AND THEN TRAVEL TO SAN FRANCISCO, RETURN TO NEW YORK AND
ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON JUNE 12. INITIAL PLANNING MEETING WITH
AMBASSADOR DOBELLE WAS SCHEDULED FOR APRIL 17 AND ARRANGE-
MENTS SEEMED TO BE GOING WELL.

3. ON THE NUCLEAR FUEL ISSUE AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED CONCERN

ABOUT POSTPONEMENT OF APRIL 7 NRC DECISION. FURTHER DELAYS WERE BEING INTERPRETED BY INDIAN PRESS, PUBLIC AND SOME MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT AS A DELIBERATE PRESSURE TACTIC. THE GOI KNEW THAT THE NRC WAS AN INDEPENDENT BODY BUT THE GOI WAS HAVING DIFFICULT IN EXPLAINING THE DELAYS TO THE PARLIAMENT PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF ATTACKS BY MRS. GANDHI

ON THE GOI AS "SELLING OUT" TO THE US.

4. THE SECRETARY EXPLAINED THAT IF THE NRC HAD VOTED ON APRIL 7 THE RESULT WOULD HAVE BEEN A 2-2 VOTE. THIS WOULD HAVE LEFT THE DECISION TO THE PRESIDENT WHO WOULD HAVE APPROVED THE EXPORT LICENSE. HOWEVER, A SIGNIFICANT DELAY WOULD HAVE ENSUED SINCE THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION WOULD HAVE HAD TO LAY BEFORE CONGRESS FOR 60 DAYS. INSTEAD WE SUBMITTED ADDITIONAL MATERIAL TO THE NRC WHICH THE NRC IS CURRENTLY CONSIDERING. WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT A POSITIVE VOTE WILL FOLLOW. NRC NOW SCHEDULED TO MEET ON INDIAN APPLICATION APRIL 17. (LANDE SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD AMBASSADOR THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS HIGHLY SENSITIVE AND IT WAS AGREED THAT THE INDIAN PRESS WOULD SIMPLY BE TOLD THAT THE INDIAN AMBASSADOR HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT NRC DELAYS AND THAT THE SECRETARY HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE ADMINISTRATION CONTINUED TO SUPPORT THE LICENSE APPLICATION AND HOPED FOR EARLY APPROVAL.)

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 091105

5. THE AMBASSADOR THEN RAISED THE DPSA ISSUE NOTING THAT HE WAS AWARE OF SOME US APPREHENSION ABOUT THIS POSSIBLE PURCHASE. THE SECRETARY STATED HE WAS CONCERNED THAT SUCH A PURCHASE WOULD CAUSE AN ARMS RACE IN SOUTH ASIA. WE HAD REFUSED TO SELL DPSAS (A-7'S) TO PAKISTAN BUT IF INDIA BOUGHT SUCH AIRCRAFT PAKISTAN WOULD ALSO TRY TO DO SO. THE USG WOULD REFUSE TO SELL DPSAS TO PAKISTAN BUT THEY COULD BE OBTAINED ELSEWHERE.

6. THE AMBASSADOR GAVE A LENGTHY EXPOSITION OF THE INDIAN CASE FOR A DPSA PURCHASE. HE ASSERTED THAT THE RELATIVE INDO-PAKISTANI AIRCRAFT BALANCE HAD BEEN REDUCED FROM THE HISTORICAL 3-1 RATIO TO 2-1. INDIA DID NOT WANT TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF ITS AIRCRAFT BUT WISHED TO REPLACE OLDER HUNTERS AND CANBERRAS WITH A DPSA. PAKISTAN HAD INTRODUCED DPSAS TO SOUTH ASIA AND HAD 60 SUCH AIRCRAFT (MIRAGES). INDIA PRESENTLY HAD NO DPSAS BUT PLANNED TO PURCHASE ONLY 30 AIRCRAFT AT A COST OF \$8 MILLION EACH. THE GOI NEEDED SUCH AIRCRAFT IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO REACH PAKISTANI AIR BASES IF PAKISTAN STARTED A NEW WAR AND IN THE CASE OF POSSIBLE HOSTILITIES WITH CHINA. THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSION BY STATING THAT HE WOULD

TAKE ANOTHE LOOK AT THIS PROBLEM AND WOULD REQUEST AN ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION. HOWEVER, HE REPEATED HIS CONCERN ABOUT A FURTHER SPIRALLING OF ARMS PURCHASES IN SOUTH ASIA. THE AMBASSADOR OFFERED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL DATA IF THERE WERE ANY DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN USG AND GOI DATA.

7. AT AMBASSADOR'S REQUEST, SECRETARY REVIEWED STATUS OF OUR CURRENT EFFORTS WITH RESPECT TO MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND EXPLAINED PRESIDENTIAL DECISION ON DEFERRING WORK ON ENHANCED RADIATON WEAPONS. VANCE

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: CAT-B, NUCLEAR COOPERATION PROGRAMS, HEAD OF GOVERNMENT VISITS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 09 apr 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STATE091105
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: PWLANDE
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: N780004-0355
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 2
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780476/aaaacmxd.tel
Line Count: 126
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: eba2aab3-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 13 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3026557
Secure: LOCK1
Status: NATIVE
Subject: APRIL 7 CALL ON SECRETARY BY INDIAN AMBASSADOR PALKHIVALA
TAGS: OVIP, PARM, TECH, US, IN
To: NEW DELHI
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/eba2aab3-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014